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3.Introduction
Programmes of organized, political violence have always been legitimized and sustained
through complex imaginative geographies. This term – following Foucault (1970), Said
(1978) and Gregory (1995) – denotes the ways in which imperialist societies are
constructed through normalizing, binary judgements about both ‘foreign’ and colonized
territories and the ‘home’ spaces which sit at the ‘heart of empire’.
Such imaginative geographies tend to be characterized by stark binaries of place
attachment. These are particularly at times of war. As the geographer Ken Hewitt (1983:
258) has argued, “war [...] mobilizes the highly charged and dangerous dialectic of place
attachment: the perceived antithesis of ‘our’ places or homeland and ‘theirs’”. Very often,
such polarizations are manufactured discursively through racist and imperial discourses
and propaganda which emanate from both formal state and other media sources. These
work to produce “an unbridled sentimentalizing of one’s own while dehumanizing the
enemy’s people and land” (ibid.). To Hewitt, such binaried constructions “seem an
essential step in cultivating readiness to destroy the latter” (1983: 258).
The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that the Bush Administration’s ‘war on terror’
rests fundamentally on such dialectical constructions of (particularly urban) place. The
essay argues that the discursive construction of the ‘war on terror’ since September 11th
2001 has been deeply marked by attempts to rework  imaginative geographies separating
the urban places of the US ‘homeland’ and those Arab cities purported to be the sources
4of ‘terrorist’ threats against US national interests. Such reworkings of popular and
political imaginative geographies have worked by projecting places, and particularly
cities, into two mutually exclusive, mutually constitutive, classifications: those, in Bush’s
famous phrase, who are by either “with us” or “against us” (sic) (see Graham, 2004).
In a world of intensifying transnational migration, transport and media flows, and
economic globalization, however, such attempts at constructing a mutually exclusive
binary – a securitized ‘inside’ enclosing the urban places of the US Empire’s
‘homeland,’  and an urbanizing ‘outside’ where US military power can preemptively
attack places deemed sources of ‘terrorist’ threats – are inevitably ambivalent.
Reconstructing imaginative geographies separating a putative urban ‘homeland’ from
the ‘terrorist’ spaces requiring US military intervention is thus inseparably bound up
with efforts to reshape material and political economic connections between ‘homeland’
and cities and the rest of the world.
Whilst dramatic, these discursive constructions are far from original. In fact they revivify
long-established colonial and Orientalist tropes to represent Middle Eastern culture as
intrinsically barbaric, infantile, backward or threatening from the point of view of
Western colonial powers. Arab cities, moreover, have often been represented by,
Western powers as dark, exotic, labrynthine, and structureless places that need to be
‘unveiled’ for the production of ‘order’ through the superior scientific and military
technologies of the occupying West. By burying “disturbing similarities between ‘us’
and ‘them’ in a discourse that systematically produces the Third World as Other”, such
5Orientalism deploys considerable ‘symbolic violence’ (Gusterson, 1999). This is done,
crucially, in order to produce both “the Third World” and “the West” (ibid.).
The Bush Administation’s language of moral absolutism is, in particular, deeply
Orientalist. It works by separating "the civilised world" – the ‘homeland’ cities which
must be ‘defended’ – from the "dark forces",  the "axis of evil", and the “terrorists nests”
of Islamic cities,  which are alleged to sustain the ‘evildoers’ which  threaten the health,
prosperity, and democracy of the whole of the ‘free’ world (Tuastad, 2003).  The result of
such imaginative geographies is an ahistorical, essentialised, and deeply Orientalist
projection of Arab civilization that is very easily worked to "recycle the same
unverifiable fictions and vast  generalizations to stir up ‘America’ against the foreign
devil"  (Said, 2003: vi).  The Orientalist notions of racial worth that helped to shape the
real and imagined geographies of Western colonialism are thus being reworked as
fundamental foundations for the ‘war’ on terror’  (Gregory, 2004a). As Paul Gilroy
suggests, these:
“old, modern notions of racial difference appear once again to be active
within the calculus [of the ‘war on terror’] that tacitly assigns
differential value to lives lost according to their locations and supposed
racial origins or considers that some human bodies are more easily and
appropriately humiliated, imprisoned. shackled, starved and destroyed
that others” (2003: 263).
6Discourses of ‘terrorism’ are crucially important in sustaining such differential values
and binaried notions (Collins and Glover, 2002). Central here is the principle of the
absolute eternality of the ‘terrorist’  -- the inviolable inhumanity and shadowy, monster-
like status of those deemed to be actual or dormant ‘terrorists’ or those sympathetic to
them (Puar and Rai, 2002). The unbound diffusion of terrorist labeling within the
rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’, moreover, works to allow virtually any political
opposition to the sovereign power of the US and its allies to be condemned as ‘terrorist’
or addressed through emergency ’anti-terrorist’ legislation. Protagonists of such
opposition are thus dehumanized, demonized, and, above all, delegitimized. “Without
defined shape, or determinate roots", Derek Gregory writes that the mantle of ‘terrorism’
can now be "be cast over any form of resistance to sovereign power" (2003: 219,
original emphasis).
In such a context, this essay traces in detail the ways in which the deep-rooted dialectics
of place attachment, and the imaginative geographies that fuel them, are at the very heart
of  the ‘war on terror’. To achieve this, three particular case studies are developed. These
address especially important ‘sites’ of place construction in the ‘war on terror’: the
reworking of imaginative geographies of US cities as ‘homeland’ spaces  which must be
reengineered to address supposed imperatives of ‘national security’ ; the intensified
imaginative construction of Islamic cities as little more than  ‘terrorist nest’ targets to
soak up US military firepower ; and the increasingly integrated treatment of both
‘homeland’ and ‘target’ cities within contemporary US military doctrine and techno-
science.
7Re-imagining ‘Homeland’ Cities as National Security Spaces
"Everything and everywhere is perceived as a border from which a
potentially threatening Other can leap" (Hage, 2003: 86)
The first  key element in the imaginative geographies of the  ‘war on terror’ is an appeal
by the Bush Administration to securitize the everyday urban spaces and technics of a
newly ‘rebordered’ US ‘homeland’ (Lutz, 2002). Here, discourses of ‘security,’
emphasizing endless threats from an almost infinite range of people, places and
technologies, are being used to justify a massive process of state building. Vast efforts are
being made by US political, military and media elites in order to “spread […] generalized
promiscuous anxiety through the American populace, a sense of imminent but inexact
catastrophe” lurking just beneath the surface of normal, technologized, (sub)urbanized,
everyday life in the US (Raban, 2004: 7).  Despite the unavoidable and continuing
interconnections between US cities and more or less distant elsewheres, "the rhetoric of
‘insides’ needing protection from external threats in the form of international
organizations is pervasive" (Dalby, 2000: 5). This reimagining of ‘homeland’ cities
involves four simultaneous processes.
The ‘Domestic Front’ in the “War on Terror”
8First, the homeland security drive is being organized as a purported attempt to protect
those ‘insides’ -- the bodies and everyday spaces of valued, non threatening, full US
citizens --  from  demonized Others apparently lurking, with a wide range of threatening
technologies and pathogens, both within and outside US national space. Fuelled by the
larger mobilization of ‘terrorist’ discourses discussed above, and the blurring of the
boundary separating law enforcement from state military activity (Kraska, 2001),  this
process has "activite[d[ a policing of points of vulnerability against an enemy who
inheres within the space of the US"  (Passavant and Dean, 2002, cited in Gregory, 2003).
The ‘enemy’ here are constructed as dormant ‘terrorists’ and their sympathizers, a
rhetoric that easily translates -- in the context of the wider portrayals of the ‘homeland at
war’ against secretive and unknowable Others -- into an overall crackdown on criticism
and dissent, or those simply deemed to be insufficiently ‘patriotic’. As a result, to put it
mildly, “cosmopolitan estrangement and democracy-enriching dissent are not being
prized as civic assets“ in the US (or UK)  in the early twenty first century (Gilroy, 2003:
266).
A ‘domestic front’ has thus been drawn in Bush’s ‘war on terror’. Sally Howell and
Andrew Shryock (2003) call this a "cracking down on diaspora". This process involves
deepening state surveillance and violence against those seen to harbor ‘terrorist threats,’
combined with radically increased efforts to ensure the effective filtering power of
national and infrastructural borders. After decades where the business press and
politicians endlessly celebrated the supposed collapse of boundaries through neoliberal
globalization, "in both political debates and policy practice, borders are very much back
9in style" (Andreas, 2003: 1). Once again, Western nations -- and the securitized cities
now seen once again to sit hierarchically within their dominant territorial patronage -- are
being normatively imagined as bounded, organized spaces with closely controlled, and
filtered,  relationships with the supposed terrors of the outside world.  In the US, for
example, national immigration, border control, transportation, and social policy strategies
have been remodeled since 9/11 in an:
 "attempt to reconstitute the [United States] as a bounded area that can be
fortified against outsiders and other global influences. In this imagining of
nation, the US ceases to be a constellation of local, national, international,
and global relations, experiences, and meanings that coalesce in places
like New York City and Washington DC; rather, it is increasingly defined
by a ‘security perimeter’ and the strict surveillance of borders" (Hyndman,
2003: 2).
Securitising Everyday Spaces and Systems
Second, as well as further militarizing national territorial borders, the US homeland
security drive is also attempting to reengineer the basic everyday systems and spaces of
US urban life -- even if this is sometimes a stealthy and invisible process.  As a result,
urban public life is being saturated by ‘intelligent’ surveillance systems, checkpoints,
‘defensive’ urban design and planning, and intensifying security (Johnson, 2002;
Williams, 2003). In the wake of 9/11, and the Homeland Security drive, the design of
buildings and streets, the management of traffic, the physical planning of cities, migration
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and refugee policy, transportation policing, the design of social policies for ethnically
diverse cities and neighborhoods, even the lending policies of neighborhood libraries, are
being brought within the widening umbrella of US ‘homeland security’.
In cities like Washington DC, completely new (and tellingly titled) ‘urban design and
security plans’ have been brought in. These emphasize that one of the most important
objectives of public urban planning in such strategic centers is now the ‘hardening’ of all
possible terrorist targets.  Once again, it seems, geopolitical and strategic concerns are
directly shaping the day to day practices of US urban professionals. Jonathan Raban,
writing of everyday life in post 9-11 Seattle, captures the palpable effects of this
militarization on urban everyday life and landscape:
“To live in America now, at least to live in a port city like Seattle -- is to
be surrounded by the machinery and rhetoric of covert war, in which
everyone must be treated as a potential enemy until they can prove
themselves a friend. Surveillance and security devices are everywhere:
the spreading epidemic of razor wire, the warnings in public libraries that
the FBI can demand to know that books you’re borrowing, the Humvee
laden with troops in combat fatigues, the Coast Guard gun boats
patrolling the bay, the pat-down searches and X-ray machines, the
nondescript grey boxes equipped with radar antennae,  that are meant to
sniff pathogens in the air” (2004: 6).
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US Cities Within Anti-Cosmopolitan  Constructions of ‘Homeland’
Third, this attempted reconstruction of national boundaries, as well as being sustained by
material and technological investments in and around strategic urban spaces, relies on
massive linguistic work (Kaplan, 2003: 85).  Tom Ridge, the Homeland Security
Secretary, for example,  has widely argued that, post 9/11, “the only turf is the turf we
stand on” (cited in Kaplan, 2003: 85). This ‘rebordered’ discourse constructs an
imaginary, domesticated, singular, and spatially fixed imagined community of US
nationhood (Andreas and Biersteker, 2003). Such an imagined community -- tied
intrinsically to some purported, familial, ‘turf’ -- centers on valorizing an exclusive,
separated and privileged population. It therefore contrasts starkly with previous US state
rhetoric which centered on notions of  boundless mobility and assimilation (Kaplan,
2003: 86).
Such discourses are central to reimagining the actual and normative geographies of what
contemporary US urban life actually consists of or what it might become. Amy Kaplan,
in analyzing the languages of ‘Homeland Security’, detects a “decidedly antiurban and
anticosmopolitan ring” to this upsurge of nationalism after 9/11 (2003: 88).  Paul Gilroy
goes further and suggests that the widespread invocation by the Bush Administration,
following Huntingdon (1993), of the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations,’ necessarily
“requires that cosmopolitan consciousness is ridiculed” in the pronouncements of the US
state and the mainstream media (2003: 266, emphasis added).  Post 9/11, he diagnoses a
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pervasive “inability to conceptualize multicultural and postcolonial relations as anything
other than ontological risk and ethnic jeopardy” (ibid. 261).
The very term ‘homeland security’, in fact, serves to rework the imaginative geographies
of contemporary US urbanism  in important ways. It shifts the emphasis away from
complex and mobile diasporic social formations, sustaining large metropolitan areas,
towards a much clearer mapping which demarcates clear, essentialized geographies of
entitlement and threat. At many scales -- from neighborhoods, through cities and nations
to the international  -- this separation works to define those citizens who are deemed to
warrant value and the full protection of citizenship, and those deemed threatening as real
or potential sources of ‘terrorism’ : the targets for the blossoming national security state.
As Amy Kaplan suggests (2003: 84), even the very word ‘homeland’ suggests some
“inexorable connection to a place deeply rooted in the past”. It necessarily problematizes
the inherently diverse and mobile fabric of the diasporas that actually constitutes the
social fabric of US urbanism.  Such language offers a “folksy rural quality, which
combines a German romantic notion of the folk with the  heartland of America to
resurrect the rural myth of American identity” (ibid. 88). At the same time, it precludes
“an urban vision of America as multiple turfs with contested points of view and
conflicting grounds upon which to stand” (ibid. 88).
Such a discourse is  particularly problematic in global metropolitan cities like New York,
constituted as they are by massive constellations of diasporic social groups.  “In what
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sense”, asks Kaplan (2003: 84), “would New Yorkers refer to their city as the homeland?
Home, yes, but homeland. Not likely”. Ironically, even the grim casualty lists of 9/11
revealed the impossibility of separating some purportedly pure, ‘inside,’ homeland city
from the wider international flows that now constitute cities like New York -- even with
massive state surveillance and violence.  "If it existed, any comfortable distinction
between domestic and international, here and there, us and them, ceased to have meaning
after that day" (Hyndman, 2003: 1). For, as  Tim Watson  writes:
"global labor migration patterns have […] brought the world to lower
Manhattan to service the corporate office blocks: the dishwashers, messengers,
coffee-cart vendors, and office cleaners were Mexican, Bangladeshi, Jamaican
and Palestinian. One of the tragedies of September 11th 2001 was that it took
such an extraordinary event to reveal the everyday reality of life at the heart of
the global city" (2003: 109).
‘Homeland security’ policies have been associated with a considerable growth in state
and non-state violence against immigrant and Arab American groups. Indeed, “the notion
of the homeland itself contributes to making the life of immigrants terribly insecure”
(Kaplan, 2003: 87). Systematic state repression and mass incarceration have been brought
to bear on Arab-American neighborhoods like Dearbon in Detroit  -- the first place to
have its own, local, office of Homeland Security (Howell and Shryock, 2003). Such
Arab-American neighborhoods are now overwhelmingly portrayed in the US national
media as “zones of threat”. Arab Americans are widely represented as “clearly being in”
their local cities and “with us” (sic), but the point is almost always stressed, as Howell
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and Shryock (2002: 444) put it, that “their hearts might still be over there, ‘with them’”
(sic).  Thousands of US citizens have also effectively been stripped of any notion of
value, to be thrown into extra or intra-territorial camps as suspect ‘terrorists for
potentially indefinite periods of time without trial.  More than ever, the discourses and
practices of the ‘war on terror’ therefore work to make “’Arab’ and ‘American’ all but
antithetical adjectives” (Watson, 2003). As we shall see shortly, this situation is
ummutably bound up with the widespread demonization of Middle Eastern and Arab
cities more generally within ‘war on terror’ discourses.
Everyday Sites and Spaces as Sources of Fear
The final element of the homeland security drive is the production of permanent anxiety
around everyday urban spaces, systems, and events that were previously banalized, taken
for granted or ignored in US urban everyday life (Luke, 2004). With streams of vague
warnings, omnipresent color coded alerts, and endless media coverage of purported
threats to US urban life, everyday events, malfunctions or acts of violence in the city --
which would previously have been seen as the results of local social problems, individual
pathologies, bureaucratic failings, or simple accidents -- are now widely assumed be the
results of  ‘terrorist’ action. The ‘homeland’ is thus cast in terms of a constant ‘state of
emergency’ (Armitage, 2002). In this the only things that can be guaranteed are new
sources of fear and oscillations on Tom Ridge’s color-coded threat monitor. In the
process, parked vans, delayed trains, envelopes with white powder, people with packages,
‘Arab’ looking people, colds and flu, low flying aircraft, electricity outages, and subway
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derailments, are now sources of mass anxiety.  Homeland security, thus depends,
ironically, on a radical insecurity. This fuels acceptance that the everyday sites and
spaces of daily life within the continental US must now be viewed as  battlegrounds – the
key sites within a new, permanent and boundless war.
Cindi Katz (2004) calls this the "routinization of terror talk and the increasing
ordinariness of its physical markers". She argues that such processes generate a radical
ontological insecurity because they create pervasive feelings of vulnerability and threat in
everyday urban life.  In the process, ‘terror talk’ helps to define reimagined communities
of nationhood as well as normative imaginative geographies of ‘homeland’ and ‘target’
cities. As Giroux (2003: ix) suggests, "notions of community [in the US] are now
organized not only around flag-waving displays of patriotism, but also around collective
fears and ongoing militarization of visual culture and public space".
‘Terror Cities’: Orientalist Constructions of
Arab Urban Places as Military Targets
Which leads us to our second case study: an analysis of the way in which (selected) Arab
cities are being overwhelmingly constructed  within ‘war on terror’ discourses as  targets
for US military firepower. Far from being isolated from the securitization of US cities,
this process is inseparable from it. As Edward Said  (2003: xxiii) stressed just before his
death, from the point of view of the discursive foundations of both US foreign policy and
dominant  portrayals of Arabs in the US media,  the  devaluation and dehumanization of
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people in the ‘target’ cities of the Arab world can not be separated from the securitization
of the (re)imagined communities in ‘homeland’ ones.  As the Iraq invasion was prepared,
Said  wrote that "without a well-organized sense that these people over there were not
like ‘us’ and didn’t appreciate ‘our’ values -- the very core of the Orientalist dogma --
there would have been no war" in Iraq.  Thus, crucially, a powerful relation exists:
“between securing the homeland against encroachment of foreign terrorists
and enforcing [US] national power abroad. The homeland may contract
borders around a fixed space of the nation and nativity, but it
simultaneously also expands the capacity of the United States to move
unilaterally across the borders of other nations”  (Kaplan, 2003: 87).
The discursive construction of selected Arab cities as targets for US military firepower
occurs in at least four interrelated ways.
Vertical Representations of Arab Cities as  Collections of Military Targets
First, the voyeuristic consumption by Western publics of the US urban bombing
campaigns that have been such a dominant feature of the ‘war on terror’ is itself based on
mediated representations where cities are actually constructed as little more than
receiving points for the dropping of murderous ordnance. Verticalized web and
newspaper maps, for example, have routinely displayed cities like Baghdad  as little
more than impact points where GPS-targeted  bombs and missiles are either envisaged to
land, or have landed, are grouped along flat, cartographic surfaces (Gregory, 2004a).
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Meanwhile, the weapons’ actual impacts on the everyday life for the ordinary Iraqis or
Afghanis who are caught up in the bombing, as ‘collateral damage’, have been both
marginalized and violently repressed by the US military. (Most famously this has
involved the bombing of Al-Jazeera transmission facilities because they transmitted
images of the dead civilians that resulted from the bombing).
In this verticalized imaginative geography, which is strongly linked to the wider history
of colonial bombing and repression by Western powers, Arab ‘cities’ are thus reduced to
the:
 “places and people you are about to bomb,  to targets, to letters on a map
or co-ordinates on a visual display. Then, missiles rain down on K-A-B-
U-L, on 34.51861N, 69.15222E, but not on the eviscerated city of Kabul,
its buildings already devastated and its population already terrorized by
years of grinding war” (Gregory 2004b).
Strikingly, the failure to even count the 11,000 or so dead Iraqi civilians that had resulted,
by September 2004,  from the war’s bombing campaigns and urban battles (IPSFP,
2004), reveals that the civilians of  targeted cities are ‘cast out’ so that they warrant no
legal status or discursive or visual presence (Gregory, 2004b). Their sacrifice can go
largely unremarked; their bloody deaths can be blindly unrepresented.
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Constructing  Arab Cities as ‘Terrorist Nests’
Second, such casting out of the lives, and suffering of ordinary civilians, is legitimized
and obscured in the ‘war on terror’  by a wider discourse in which the entire cities of such
victims are essentialized as little more than ‘factories’ or ‘nests’ sustaining ‘terrorists’
and ‘extremists’. To achieve this, huge discursive and material work is being done by
both the US military and the mainstream US media to construct Islamic cities as
dehumanized ‘terror cities’ -- nest-like environments who’s very geography undermines
the high-tech, orbital, mastery of US forces. For example, as a major battle raged there in
April 2004 in which over 600 Iraqi civilians died General Richard Myers, Chair of the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, labeled the whole of Fallujah a dehumanized "rat’s nest" or
"hornet’s nest" of "terrorist resistance" against US occupation that needed to be "dealt
with" (quoted in News24.com, 2004).
Such disclosures have been backed up by widespread popular geopolitical representations
of Iraqi cities. Derek Gregory (2004b, 202), for example, analyses how, in their pre-
invasion discussions about the threat of ‘urban warfare’ to US forces in Iraq, mainstream
news media like Time Magazine  repeatedly depicted Orientalized streets where “nothing
was what it seemed, where deceipt and danger threatened at every turn” and where the
US forces’ high-tech weapons and surveillance gear were the key to “reveal the traps”
and “lift” the Orientalized veil obscuring Iraqi urban places (ibid.).
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In the bloody urban battles of 2004 for Saddam City, Fallujah and Najaf the
promulgations of the US military forces fighting in Iraq -- and their leaders back in the
US proper -- have also routinely blended Islamophobic racism and crude Orientalism.
Again, this worked to continually reinforce the perception that these cities are little but
‘nests’ of terrorist violence that necessitate targeting by superior US surveillance
technologies and military firepower which will somehow act to ‘cleanse’ or redeem the
intrinsically terroristic urban places of Iraq. “The Iraqis are sick people and we are the
chemotherapy”, boasted one US Marine to the New Statesman in April 2003. Levened in
here have been widespread invocations of some essentialized ‘Arab mind’ (see Patai,
1983). “You have to understand the Arab mind”, suggested Captain Todd Brown, a
company commander with the U.S. Fourth Infantry Division in Baghdad in early
December 2003. “The only thing they understand is force – force, pride and saving face”
(quoted in Wilkins, 2003).
Widespread pronouncements of the fighting US soldiers themselves illustrate these
imaginative geographies all too clearly. US Marine snipers after the battle of Fallujah, for
example, talked exultantly about their ‘kills’ of "rag-heads" and "sand niggers" in
Fallujah (Davis, 2004). Shocked senior British Officers in Iraq – who’s forces are far
from blameless in terms of brutality against Iraqi civilians, even alleged -- anonymously -
- that American forces often viewed Iraqi civilians “as untermenschen [the Nazis’ word
for subhuman]" (quoted in Rayment, 2004: 4). This view, of course, has been reinforced
by the extending list of prison torture scandals that have erupted since the end of the
2003.
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Added to these street-level discourses, a large group of professional ‘urban warfare’
commentators, writing regular columns in US newspapers, have routinely projected
deeply racist notions implying that the inhabitants of targeted Iraqi cities are merely
subhuman pests requiring extermination. An important example comes from the highly
influential urban warfare commentator, Ralph Peters, writing in the neo-conservative New
York Post. To Peters and many like him cities like Fallujah and Najaf are little more than
killing zones which challenge the US military to harness its techno-scientific might to
sustain hegemony. This must be done, he argues, by killing ‘terrorists’ as rapidly and
efficiently -- and with as few US casualties -- as possible. During the battle of Fallujah,
Peters (2004a) labeled the entire City  a "terror-city" in his column. Praising the US
Marines "for hammering the terrorists into the dirt" in the battle, he nevertheless
castigated the cease fire negotiations that, he argued, had allowed those ‘terrorists’ left
alive to melt back into the civilian population (2004a).
In a later article Peters (2004b) concluded that a military, technological solution was
available to US forces that would enable them to ‘win’ such battles more conclusively in
the future: killing faster, before any international media coverage is possible. "This is the
new reality of combat,"  he wrote. "Not only in Iraq. But in every broken country, plague
pit and terrorist refuge to which our troops have to go in the future" (Peters, 2004b).
Arguing that the presence of "global media" meant that "a bonanza of terrorists and
insurgents" were allowed to "escape’ US forces in Fallujah, US forces, he argued "have
to speed the kill" (2004b).  By "accelerating urban combat" to "fight within the ‘media
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cycle’ before journalists sympathetic to terrorists and murderers can twist the facts and
portray us as the villains," new technologies were needed, Peters suggested. This was so
that "our enemies are overwhelmed and destroyed before hostile cameras can defeat us. If
we do not learn to kill very, very swiftly, we will continue to lose slowly"  (Peters,
2004b).
Othering by Simulation  I :  ‘Urban Warfare’  Video Games
 “In a world being torn apart by international conflict, one thing is on
everyone’s mind as they finish watching the nightly news: ‘Man, this
would make a great game!’” (Jenkins, 2003: 18).
Third, the construction of Arab cities as targets for US military firepower now sustains a
large industry of computer gaming and simulation. Such simulations -- which are created
especially to create positive images for the US military amongst younger computer game
users -- “propel the player into the world of the gaming industry’s latest fetish: modern
urban warfare” (DelPiano, 2004).  They work to further reinforce imaginary geographies
equating Islamic cities with ‘terrorism’ and US military intervention.
Such games serve to blur the boundaries separating war from entertainment. Worse still,
they demonstrate that “the entertainment industry has assumed a posture of co-operation
towards a culture of permanent war” (Deck, 2004).  Within such games, Arab cities are
represented  merely as “collections of objects not congeries of people” (Gregory, 2004b:
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201).  When people are represented they are the shadowy, subhuman, racialized figures
of  absolutely external ‘terrorists’ to be annihilated repeatedly in sanitized ‘action’ as
entertainment or military training (or both).  Andrew Deck (2004) argues that the
proliferation of urban warfare games based on actual, ongoing, US military interventions
in Arab cities, works to “call forth a cult of ultra-patriotic xenophobes whose greatest joy
is to destroy, regardless of how racist, imperialistic, and flimsy the rationale” for the
simulated battle.
The US Army  -- which now brands itself as "the world’s premier land force" -- itself
works hard and at many levels to demonize Arab urbanism per se through the medium of
video games.  In fact it is now the world’s biggest developer of video games which it now
deliberately deploys as aids to training and recreation amongst US soldiers and the
generation of both recruits and revenue (Gaudiosi, 2004).
The products of this work are dominated by scenarios which depict US soldiers fighting
dark, animalistic figures in highly unrealistic portrayals of supposedly Arab cities. Here,
once again, the only role for the everyday sites and spaces of the city is as environments
for military engagement.  “Cars are used as bombs, bystanders become victims [although
they die without spilling blood], houses become headquarters, apartments become
lookout points, and anything to be strewn in the street becomes suitable cover”
(DelPiano,2004). Indeed, the actual physical geographies of Arab cities are being
digitized to provide the three-dimensional ‘battlespace’ for each game.  One games
developer boasts that “we’ve built a portion of the downtown area of a large Middle
23
Eastern capital city where we [sic] have a significant presence today” (cited in Deck,
2004).
These representations, of course, resonate strongly with the pronouncements of military
urban warfare specialists in the wider media like those of Ralph Peters discussed above.
They also  blur with increasing seamlessness into news reports about the actual Iraq war.
Kuma Reality Games, for example, which has actually sponsored Fox news’s coverage of
the ‘war on terror’ in the US, uses this sponsorship to promote an urban combat game. ,
In their words, this centers on US Marines fighting “militant followers of radical Shiite
cleric Muqtaqa al-Sadr in the filthy urban slum that is Sadr city” (quoted in Deck, 2004).
Not to be outdone, the US Army itself now gives games such as America’s Army  -- with
its simulations of ‘counter terror’ warfare in densely packed Islamic cities in a fictional
country of ‘Zekistan’ -- free to millions over the Internet as an aid to recruitment . "The
mission" of America’s Army, writes Steve O’Hagan (2004):
"is to slaughter evildoers, with something about ‘liberty’ [...] going on
in the back ground [...]. These games may be ultra-realistic down to the
caliber of the weapons, but when bullets hit flesh people just crumple
serenely into a heap. No blood. No exit wounds. No screams"
America’s Army has been followed up by the even more elaborate game, Full Spectrum
Warrior, another ex-military training video game in which US forces again wage urban
warfare in simulations of Middle Eastern cities whilst  this time dispensing racist and
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Islamophobic expletives.  Even  some video game reviewers have commented that “this
game would have been fine without the tawdry 4 letter words and negative racist
remarks” from the simulated US soldiers (Peterson, 2004).  Such racist remarks have
done little to inhibit the game’s popularity, however. Writing in a chat room on the neo-
conservative FreeRepublic.Com, one reviewer of the game gushes that, “given the current
state of the world, it's amazingly relevant, not to mention fun to fire on raghead terrorist
wanna-be's”.
Othering by Simulation II :  ‘Urban Warfare’ Training Sites
Finally, to parallel such virtual, voyeuristic, Othering, US and Western military forces
have constructed their own simulations of Islamic cities as targets -- this time in physical
space. A chain of 80 mock ‘Islamic’ urban districts have been built across the world since
9/11 designed purely to hone the skills of US forces in fighting and killing in ‘urbanized
terrain".  Taking 18 months to construct, these simulated ‘cities’ are then endlessly
destroyed and remade in practice assaults that hone the US forces for the ‘real thing’ in
sieges such as those in Fallujah.  Replete with minarets, pyrotechnic systems, loop-tapes
with calls to prayer, donkeys, hired ‘civilians’ in Islamic dress wandering through narrow
streets, and olfactory machines to create the smell of rotting corpses, this shadow urban
system simulates not the complex cultural, social or physical realities of real Middle
Eastern urbanism, but the imaginative geographies of the military and theme park
designers that are brought in to design and construct it.
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Constructing  ‘Homeland’ and ‘Target’ Cities
Within U.S. Military Techno-science
“The [US] Air Force wants to be able to strike mobile and
emerging targets in fewer than 10 minutes so that such targets will
have no sanctuary from US air power”, Adam Hebert, (2003).
All of which leads neatly to our final case study: an exploration of the dialectical
production of  ‘homeland’ and ‘target’ cities within US military strategy.  In the huge
research and development now going on to sustain the 'war on terror,'  US military
doctrine now emphasizes the use of the nation's unassailable advantages in military
techno-science to address, and construct,  both homeland cities and the targeted, Arab
cities, in completely integrated ways. Both are being emphasized as crucial ‘targets’
within one, singular, urbanizing ‘battlespace’. This is being integrated through the US
military’s advances in speed-of-light surveillance, communication and orbital, air and
space-based targeting capabilities (the result of what is widely termed the ‘Revolution in
Military Affairs’ or ‘network-centric warfare’ – see Dillon, 2002; Duffield, 2002,
respectively).
Crucially, however, this very integration of geographically-distanced urban sites through
military techno-science is being done in a manner which actually inscribes highly
divisive, Orientalized,  judgements of  people’s right to life within the ‘war on terror’ into
hard, military systems of control, targeting and, sometimes, (attempted) killing. These
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systems, very literally, enable and reinforce the geopolitical and urban architectures of
US Empire, with their stark judgements of the value -- or lack of value -- of the urban
subjects, and human lives, under scrutiny. The emerging trans-global surveillance and
targeting systems of the US military continually work to try and expose all subjects, in
both ‘homeland’ and ‘target’ domains, to scrutiny. In the ‘target’ cities where those
subjects are deemed to warrant no rights or protections, this exposure is combined with
potentially instant, continuous, violence and death.
“How Technology Will Defeat Terrorism”
By way of demonstrating this argument, let me start by drawing on one particularly clear
example of how dialectical imaginative geographies of cities, and the military techno-
science of US Empire, are being produced, and imagined, together,  by those shaping the
direction of US military techno-science. This comes from an article titled “How
technology will defeat terrorism” produced in 2002 by Peter Huber and Mark Mills -- two
leading U.S. defense analysts closely involved, through their defense company Digital
Power Capital,  in the 'war on terror'.
Huber and Mills’s (2002:25) starting point is that the United States now has "sensing
technologies that bring to the battlefield abroad, and to the vast arena of civilian defense
here at home, the same wizardry that transformed the mainframe computer into the Palm
Pilot, the television tower into the cell phone".  From the point of view of  ‘homeland’
cities and systems of cities within US national borders,  Huber and Mills argue that this
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advantage in electronic sensing capabilities means that, "step by step, cities like New
York must now learn to watch and track everything that moves" (ibid. 27). This must
happen, they argued, as sophisticated, software-based surveillance systems which use
algorithms to automatically surveille massive quantities of data to pre-emptively 'sniff'
out for signs of ‘terrorist’ activity, are woven into the complex everyday technics that
constitute  urban America,. "In the post-September 11 world," they write, ‘smart’
computerized systems need to be rolled out to all the infra structural systems of urban
America so that US homeland security agencies can "see the plastic explosives in the
truck before they detonate, the anthrax before its dispersed, the sarin nerve gas before it
gets into the air-conditioning duct" (ibid. 28).
In the ‘target’ cities and spaces of the Middle East, on the other hand, Huber and Mills
stress that similar, automated systems of sensing and surveillance must also be
seamlessly integrated into the high-tech US military machine. Rather than pinpointing
and reducing threats, however, the purpose of these systems, this time, is to continuously
project death and destruction to pinpointed locations in the cities and spaces that have
discursively been constructed as targets for US military power in the ‘war on terror’. "We
really do want an Orwellian future  not in Manhattan, but in Kabul," they argue. Their
prognosis is stark and dualistic:
"Terrorist wars will continue, in one form or another, for as long as we
live. […] We are destined to fight a never-ending succession of micro-
scale battles, which will require us to spread military resources across vast
expanses of empty land and penetrate deep into the shadows of lives lived
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at the margins of human existence. Their conscripts dwell in those
expanses and shadows. Our soldiers don't, and cant for any extended
period of time. What we have instead is micro-scale technology that is both
smarter and more expendable than their fanatics, that is more easily
concealed and more mobile, that requires no food and sleep, and that can
endure even harsher conditions" (ibid. 29)
Saturating adversary cities and territories with millions of ‘loitering’ surveillance and
targeting devices, intimately linked into global surveillance and targeting systems, thus
becomes the invisible and unreported shadow of the high-profile, technologically similar,
'homeland' security systems erected within and between the cities of the US mainland.
To Huber and Mills, the United State's "longer-term objective must be to infiltrate their
[sic] homelands electronically, to the point where we can listen to and track anything that
moves", where the ‘their’ refers to the ‘terrorists’ inhabiting the targeted cities (ibid. 30).
Then, when purported ‘targets’ are detected, U.S. forces:
"can then project destructive power precisely, judiciously, and from a safe
distance week after week, year after year, for as long as may be necessary. […]
Properly deployed at home, as they can be, these technologies of freedom will
guarantee the physical security on which all our civil liberties ultimately
depend. Properly deployed abroad, they will destroy privacy everywhere we
need to destroy it.[…]  At home and abroad, it will end up as their sons against
our silicon. Our silicon will win" (ibid, 31-34).
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Technophiliac Unveilings of ‘Homeland’ and ‘Target’ Cities
Strikingly, in Huber and Mills’s scenario, political  judgements about the (lack of) value
of human life in the demonized cities and spaces that have been so powerfully
(re)constructed in ‘war on terror’ discourses, is actually maintained and policed through
automated surveillance and killing systems. For here the disposability of life in such
‘target’ cities is maintained continuously by the ongoing presence of Unmanned  Combat
Aerial  Vehicles (or UCAVs) armed with missiles. These weapons can be launched at
short notice once the surveillance webs that saturate the ‘target’ cities detects some
notional ‘target’.
Far from being some fanciful military futurology from Huber and Mills’ technophiliac
fantasies, these principles are actually directly shaping the design of new US military
systems which are already under development or even deployment.  Thus, on the one
hand, as already mentioned, the cities and urban corridors within US national borders are
being wired up with a vast range of automated sensors which are designed to detect and
locate a whole spectrum of potentially ‘terrorist’ threats. On the other hand, the
Pentagon’s R and D outfit, DARPA (the Defense Applications Research and Projects
Agency) are now developing the sorts of massive, ‘loitering’ surveillance grids to try and
‘unveil’ the supposedly impenetrable and labyrinthine landscapes of closely built Middle
Eastern cities. In a new program labeled Combat Zones That See” (or CTS), DARPA
(2003) is developing systems of micro-cameras and sensors that can be scattered
discretely across both circling UCAVs and built urban landscapes that automatically
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scan millions of vehicles and human faces for ‘known targets’ and record any event
deemed to be ‘unusual’. “The ability to track vehicles across extended distances is the
key to providing actionable intelligence for military operations in urban terrain”, the brief
for the Program argues. “Combat Zones that See will advance the state of the art for
multiple-camera video tracking to the point where expected tracking length reaches city-
sized distances” (DARPA, 2003).
Befitting the definition of Middle Eastern ‘target’ cities  within US military doctrine as
zones where human life warrants little protection or ornamentation  “actionable’ here is
most likely to be translated in practice -- Israeli style -- as automated or near-automated
aerial attempts at killing the ‘targeted’ person(s). Because urban density in target cities is
seen “to render “stand-off sensing from airborne and space-borne platforms ineffective”
(DARPA,  2003), CTS’s main role will be to hold even targets within densely urbanized
spaces ‘at risk’ from near-instant targeting and destruction from GPS-guided weapons. In
US military jargon this is termed “compressing the kill chain” -- a process which “closes
the time delay between sensor and shooter” to an extent that brings “persistent area
dominance” (or “PAD”) even over and within dense megacities like Baghdad (Hebert,
2003).
Since 2002, for the first time, fleets of identical US unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
have  indeed patrolled both the increasingly militarized border of the Southern United
States and the cities and frontier lands of the war zones of the Middle East. Identical, that
is, except in one crucial respect. For in the latter case these unmanned aircraft have been
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armed for the first time with missiles and have undertaken, by remote control, at least 70
assassination raids targeting alleged ‘terrorists’ (and those are unlucky enough to be close
by) in Yemen, Afghanistan and Iraq.
The ‘success’ of these aerial and long-distance assassinations has fuelled much broader
investments in the development of aerial vehicles and munitions that will combine with
CTS-type systems to provide the military holy grail of ‘persistent area dominance’.
Massive efforts are already underway to develop such a capability. This effort
specifically addresses urban ‘target’ areas through what is being termed, in the jargon,
“Total Urban Dominance Layered System” (or TUDLS) (Plenge, 2004). This program,
which builds on CTS, will deliver “a family of integrated and complementary vehicles
layered over an urban area to provide persistent dominance” (ibid.). In the euphemistic
geek-speak of the US military, TUDLS will encompass “long hover and loiter
propulsions systems, multi-discriminant sensors and seekers, mini- and micro-air
vehicles, mini-lethal and non-lethal warheads, autonomous and man-in-the-loop control
algorithms, and a strong interface with the battlespace information network” (Plenge,
2004).
For those unused to the euphemisms here it must be stressed that ‘autonomous control
algorithms’ actually means that the flying vehicles, and the computer systems that control
them, will, eventually, be designed to take the decisions to kill purported ‘targets’ without
any human intervention whatsoever.  Entirely robotic attack aircraft or ‘dominators’ are
already under development by the US Air Force (Tirpak, 2001). As the blurb from one
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manufacturer puts it, “these dominators will be capable of completing the entire kill chain
with minimal human involvement” (Plenge, 2004).
Conclusions
This essay has demonstrated some of the  ways in which the political, discursive, material
and geographical dimensions of the Bush Administration’s ‘war on terror’ rest
fundamentally on dialectical constructions of urban place. Such constructions, essentially,
invoke both political and public reworkings of imaginative geographies. These are shaped
and legitimized to do geopolitical work. Moreover, it has been shown that the dialectical
constructions of urban place which underlie the ‘war on terror’ can only really be
understood if analysis stretches to cover the mutually constitutive representation of both
‘homeland’ and ‘target’ cities. In achieving this unusually broad approach, the current
essay allows us to make three brief conclusions.
First, and crucially, there are extremely strong resonances between the dialectical
constructions of urban places in official US ‘war on terror’ pronouncements and those in
the ‘popular geopolitical’ domains of news media, novels, internet chat rooms, films and,
most notable of all, video games. This points to the increasing integration of the
prosecution, representation, and imagination of ‘asymmetric’ urban warfare in the early
21st century. The growth of the “military-industrial-media-entertainment network” (Der
Derian, 2001) that sustains this blurring is occurring as reporters become ‘embedded’ in
urban combat (with the language of “they’re moving out” becoming a language of “we’re
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moving out”); theme park designers construct ‘mock’ Islamic cities for US urban combat
training; voyeuristic media endlessly ratchet up both fear about attacks in the ‘urban
homeland’ and  legitimize preemptive war in ‘target cities’; private military corporations
soak up huge contracts for both ‘homeland security’ and overseas military aggression;
and the military themselves construct Orientalist and racist video games where
virtualized Arab cities are experienced as mere environments for the killing of ‘terrorists’
as entertainment for US suburbanites in the ‘homeland’. Importantly, this complex of
discourses and representations – themselves the product of deeply militarized popular and
political cultures -- work, on the one hand, to problematize  urban cosmopolitanism in
‘homeland cities’ and, on the other, to essentialize and reify the social ecologies of
‘target’ cities in profoundly racist ways.
Second, this essay has demonstrated that the production of this highly charged dialectic --
the forging of  exclusionary, nationalist, imagined communities and the Othering of
whole swathes of our urbanizing planet -- has been a fundamental prerequisite for the
legitimisation of the entire ‘war on terror’. Worryingly, such fundamentalist and racist
constructions of urban place have their almost exact shadow in the charged dialectics of
urban place routinely disseminated by al-Qa’eda itself. Here, however, the ‘targets’ are
the ‘infidel,’ ‘Christian,’  or ‘Zionist’ cities of the West or Israel. The sentimentalized
spaces of the Islamic ‘homeland’, meanwhile, are to be violently ‘purified’  of Western
presence in order to create a transnational Islamic space or umma which systematically
excludes all diversity and Otherness through continuous, murderous force.
34
The real tragedy of the ‘war on terror’, then, is that it has closely parallelled al-Qa’eda in
invoking homogeneous and profoundly exclusionary notions of ‘community’ as a way of
legitimizing massive violence based on this charged place dialectic and hypermasculine
notions of assymetric war (Gilroy, 2003). In so doing, the ‘war on terror’ has worked to
construct a  self reinforcing cycle of terrorist atrocity and counter-terrorist atrocity. Once
set in train, as we see in both Iraq and in Israel-Palestine, such cycles are extraordinarily
difficult to reverse. As  Zulaika (2003, 198) suggests:
"is that such a categorically ill-defined, perpetually deferred, simple
minded Good-versus-Evil war [‘against terror’] echoes and re-creates the
very absolutist mentality and exceptionalist tactics of the insurgent
terrorists. By formally adopting the terrorists’ own game – one that by
definition lacks rules of engagement, definite endings, clear alignments
between enemies and fiends, or formal arrangements of any sort, military,
political, legal, or ethical – the inevitable danger lies in reproducing it
endlessly" .
Finally, the imaginative geographies that run through ‘war on terror’ discourses, which
stress separateness and the total difference between ‘homeland’ and ‘target’ cities, are
being overlaid by much more complex geographies of connection and disconnection.
Thus, a revivified Orientalism is used to remake imaginative geographies of ‘inside’ and
‘outside’ just as a wide range of processes demonstrate how redundant such binaries now
are.  On the one hand, the construction of ‘homeland cities’ as endlessly vulnerable
spaces open without warning to an almost infinite range of threats,  actually works to
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underline the integration of such spaces into the manifold flows and processes of
globalization. On the other, the techno-scientific systems that actually allow US military
forces to undertake trans-global military operations as part of the ‘war on terror,’
increasingly treat ‘home’ and ‘target’ domains as a single, trans-national, and
increasingly urban ‘battlespace.’
As we saw in our third case study, however, the crucial difference here is that the
judgements about the value of the urban subjects that are now under scrutiny in both sets
of cities – shaped by Orientalist and ‘terrorist’ Othering -- could not be more different. In
‘homeland’ cities, to be sure, there is intensifying surveillance and (attempted) social
control, the endless ‘terror talk’, and highly problematic clampdowns and potentially
indefinite incarcerations for the thousands of people deemed to display the signifiers of
real or ‘dormant’ terrorists. In the ‘targeted’ urban spaces of the Arab world, meanwhile,
systems are currently being designed which will actually be weapons of automated,
continuous, assassination.
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